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Beyond MITE-CTS v. Dynamics: Has
Management Won the Battle in the Fight
Against the Tender Offer, and What
Injury has the Individual Shareholder

Suffered?

I.

INTRODUCTION

The tender offer' has become a widely used2 and effective 3
method for obtaining control of publicly held corporations through
the acquisition of shares of stock. The use of this device to obtain
1. A "tender offer" is a method for acquiring control of a publicly held
corporation and "has been conventionally understood to be a publicly made
invitation addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares for
sale at a specified price." Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer"
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251 (1973)
(footnotes omitted). Professor Robert Hamilton describes a cash tender offer as
follows:
Essentially, a cash tender offer is a public invitation to the shareholders
of the target corporation to tender their shares to the aggressor for
purchase for cash. As developed during the 1960's, the offering price was
set usually 15-20 per cent in excess of the then current market price. The
aggressor sought enough shares to ensure working control of the target
corporation, though sometimes the aggressor was seeking a higher percentage of, or all of, the outstanding shares. The aggressor usually made
a public offer or invitation for tenders of shares under which it was not
obligated to purchase any shares unless the required amount was tendered;
if an excess was tendered the aggressor could, at its option, purchase the
excess shares or purchase the required amount only on a pro rata or firstcome/first-serve basis. The tender offer was usually made by an advertisement in the financial press, and copies were often mailed to all shareholders
as well. The offer also usually provided a generous commission to brokers
who persuaded customers to tender shares.
R. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS
AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 786 (1986).
2. See generally E. ARANOW & E. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 64-66 (1973) [hereinafter E. ARANOW & E. EINHORN].
3. The tender offer is "the most effective means now available for wresting
control from a resisting management."

Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory,

the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57
TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1978).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 9

corporate control has become the object of considerable debate.
Both the federal government 4 and the individual states5 have responded to issues surrounding this debate by enacting legislation to
govern the use of the tender offer.
The legislation adopted by some states to control the use of the
tender offer has conflicted with applicable federal law. The United
States Supreme Court has decided two major cases concerning this
conflict, Edgar v. MITE Corp.6 and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America7 (hereinafter CTS). In the more recent of the two
decisions, CTS, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of an Indiana
statute regulating the use of the tender offer.' An examination of
the Williams Act, 9 the predominant federal legislation governing
tender offers, and the Act's legislative history indicates the Court
may have erred in upholding the Indiana statute, and given management of target companies a significant advantage vis-A-vis the tender
offeror. The case could have the serious effect of making the tender
offer a highly ineffective and expensive device for obtaining control
of publicly held corporations. This note will highlight the inconsistencies between the two Supreme Court cases, explain the present
effect of both cases, and suggest an approach for states considering
the adoption of takeover legislation.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE NATURE AND HISTORY
OF THE TENDER OFFER

In the past, the phenomenon of corporations purchasing their
own stock was relatively common. 10 Several reasons for such a
purchase exist:I 1 (1) to eliminate small shareholdings; (2) to facilitate
the purchase of the corporation; and (3) to recapitalize the corporation to obtain a more effective capital structure.1 2 The tendency
4. Congress has adopted the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 954
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
5. In the 10 years after the passage of the Williams Act, 37 states adopted
takeover legislation. For a list of the state statutes, see Note, A Failed Experiment:
State Takeover Regulation After Edgar v. MITE Corp., 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 457,
457 n.4.
6. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
7. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
8. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1652 (1987).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
10. See Zilber, Corporate Tender Offers for Their Own Stock: Some Legal
and FinancialConsiderations, 33 U. GIN. L. REV. 315 (1964) [hereinafter Zilber].
11. See id. at 317-19.
12. Id. at 319.
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for corporations to make such purchases usually increased during

periods of stock market decline. 3 While most of these purchases
were typically made in the open market, during the mid-1960s many

corporations began to employ the more formal method of seeking
tenders of stock directly from their shareholders.14 During this time,

the cash tender offer became increasingly utilized as a means to
carry out a corporate takeover attempt. 5 Unlike the traditional
takeover methods, most notably mergers and the proxy mechanism,
tender offers were not heavily regulated;16 therefore, the tender offer,
in all its forms, 7 became a well-liked and widely used means for
acquiring control of a corporation.

8

13. Id. at 315.
14. Id. at 315-16.
15. Throughout this period tender offers were primarily used by corporations
to purchase their own shares and b-y corporations that wanted to gain control of
another corporate entity, the "target" company, when the corporate offeror was
on friendly terms with the management of the target company. See Fleischer &
Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition By Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 318
(1967) [hereinafter Fleischer & Mundheim]. Widespread use of the tender offer
occurred as a result of rising levels of corporate liquidity, a relatively great amount
of credit availability and the growing acceptance of the tender offer as a takeover
device. See Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids-For Bidders, Incumbent Management and Shareholders, 45 HARV. Bus. REV. 135 (1967).
16. Tender offers were basically only subject to disclosure and registration
requirements under state and federal law. See Zilber, supra note 10, at 332-50.
Furthermore, only a limited number of tender offers were subject to such requirements. Id. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs has
described the nature of federal law governing tender offers at this time as follows:
The Federal securities laws not only required disclosure in connection with
the issuance and trading of securities, but also imposed disclosure and
procedural regulations on certain forms of corporate control contests,
particularly with regard to the solicitation of proxies. However, neither
[sic] Federal nor State law prior to the 1960's regulated control contests
conducted by means of a cash tender offer. Bidders thus were able to
acquire control of public companies on a first-come, first-served basis.
Because bidders were offering cash, and not securities, existing Federal
securities disclosure requirements did not apply. In 1968, in response to
the lack of information available to investors about a cash tender offer
for their securities and certain abusive practices developed by bidders,
Congress amended sections 13 and 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. These amendments are known as the Williams Act.
S. REP. No. 265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1987) (emphasis added).
17. One commentator has described the varying characteristics of the tender
offer as follows:
A tender offer may be either a firm or a conditional offer inviting
shareholders of one or more classes of stock to submit all or part of their
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Because of the substantial lack of regulation governing tender
offers, this takeover device became the most expedient means for
obtaining control of a target company, 19 especially when the takeover
attempt was a "hostile" one. 20 Other advantages of the tender offer
were that it represented a less expensive means to obtain control of
a target company than the traditional methods, and the consequences
of the acquirer's failure to gain the desired level of control over the
target tended to be less severe. 2' However, the most important
advantage of the tender offer at this time was the element of surprise
associated with it.22 If a cash tender offer was used, the potential
acquirer simply needed to place an advertisement asking shareholders
to tender their shares at a fixed price.23 Typically, no filing with any
regulatory agency was required. 24 If the tender offeror could notify
shareholders of the target without revealing the bid to incumbent
management, then management would have no opportunity to con25
vince shareholders to retain their shares.
stockholdings in exchange for cash, bonds or stock of a different class in
the offeror corporation, stock in another corporation, other property, or
a combination of these items. The offer is limited in time, usually to less
than a month, with an option in the corporation to extend the period.
Acceptance of the tender offer by the shareholder is accomplished by
sending in his share certificates, accompanied by a letter of transmittal,
directly to designated transfer agents of the corporation or through usual
brokerage channels.
Zilber, supra note 10, at 316-17 (footnotes omitted). This article will focus on the
unconditional cash tender offer.
18. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 2, at 70.
19. See Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REV. 377, 377-80 (1969).
20. When the incumbent management of a target corporation is opposed to
a potential acquirer's bid for the target, the takeover attempt is often labelled as
"hostile." In such a situation the bidder's choice of a means for obtaining control
is limited to a tender offer, an exchange offer or a proxy contest, because a merger
requires the approval of the target company's management. See Fleischer &
Mundheim, supra note 15, at 320. An exchange offer is a means of obtaining
control of a target company by which the offering corporation makes an offer to
shareholders of the target to exchange their shares for shares of the offering
corporation. For a discussion of proxy contests and the law governing them, see
E. ARANOW & E. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (2d ed.
1968).
21. See Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 15, at 318-21.

22. See Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal

Securities Regulation, 41
& Mofsky].
23. See id. at 501.
24. See id.

ST. JOHN'S

L.

REV.

499, 501 (1967) [hereinafter Sowards

25. Without knowledge of the takeover attempt, management could also not
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Because of a lack of adequate regulation to protect target
shareholders, entities and individuals were able to abuse the tender
offer process. Shareholders were often pressured into hasty decisions
about whether to tender their shares, because offerors would place
short time limitations on their offers. 26 If a shareholder rejected the
offer, his or her interest 27 in the target corporation might be negatively effected if the tender offeror obtained control. 28 Shareholders
who tendered their shares ran the risk that they could sell only a
portion of their holdings, as most tender offerors sought only a
limited number of shares. 29 If the tender offeror gained control of
the target, these individuals' remaining interest would be at risk
since the acquirer could take action harmful to the minority shareholders. 30 Without adequate information about the entity or persons
making the tender offer, shareholders experienced considerable difficulty in determining whether to tender their shares." Therefore,
many minority shareholders often tendered their shares early, 2 at a
price lower than that received by shareholders who held out for a
higher price."
Judicial attempts to curb abuses of the tender offer process, by
expanding the application of existing securities laws, proved unsuccessful. 3 4 This deficiency necessitated effective legislation governing
the tender offer.
deploy any of the weapons in its arsenal to defeat the takeover attempt, such as
mustering support of shareholders by paying an increased regular dividend, repurchasing shares on behalf of the corporation thereby reducing the number of shares
available for tender, or arranging an apparently attractive merger with a "friendly"
third party corporation. See Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REV. 377,
379-80 (1969).
26. See Zilber, supra note 10, at 316-17.
27. Both the individual shareholder's financial and control interests in his or
her shares might be negatively affected.
28. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2812; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1967).
29. See Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 15, at 336.
30. See supra note 28.
31. Id.
32. See Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 15, at 346, 350.
33. Although the price offered to shareholders was fixed, competing offers
and shareholder resistance to the fixed price often caused the tender offeror to
increase the offering price to those who had not yet tendered. See A. BROMBERG &
L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD, § 6.1 (100) at 109 (Supp.

1969).

34. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 390 (S.D.N.Y.
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III. THE WILLIAMS ACT
To remedy the gap in federal regulation of tender offers, Senator
Harrison Williams sponsored legislation in October 1965 to require
tender offerors to make advance disclosures." The original proposal
evolved over the next two years in response to various concerns
expressed by the SEC, interested parties from private industry, and
36
the New York Stock Exchange.
When introducing the legislation on the Senate floor, Senator
Williams stated:
This legislation will close a significant gap in investorprotection under the Federal securities laws by requiring the disclosure of pertinent information to stockholders when persons
seek to obtain control of a corporation by a cash tender offer
or through open market or privately negotiated purchases of
7
3

securities.
Senator Williams emphasized the theme of investor protection on
the day the measure was passed by the Senate.3

He also expressed

his concern for the interests of the individual investor.3

9

Affirming

1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1968), modified on rehearing en banc, 405 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1968); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. D. Kaltman & Co., 283 F.
Supp. 763, 764-65 (S.D.N.J. 1967); Pacific Ins. Co. v. Blot, 267 F. Supp. 956, 958
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
35. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
36. 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams).
37. 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967) (emphasis added).
38. In highlighting investor protection as one of the primary objectives of
the legislation, Senator Williams stated:
[The federal securities laws] provide protection for millions of American
investors by requiring full disclosure of information in connection with
the public offering and trading of securities. These laws have worked well
in providing the public with adequate information on which to base
intelligent investment decisions ....
There are, however, some areas still
remaining where full disclosure is necessary for investor protection but
not required by present law. One such area is the purchase by direct
acquisition or by tender offers of substantial blocks of the securities of
publicly held companies.
S. 510 ... provides for investor protection in these areas.
113 CONG. REC. 24662, 24664 (1967) (emphasis added).
39. On the day the measure passed the Senate, Senator Williams stated:
Today, the public shareholder in deciding whether to reject or accept a
tender offer possesses limited information. No matter what he does, he
acts without adequate knowledge to enable him to decide rationally what
is the best course of action. This is precisely the dilemma which our
securities laws are designed to prevent.
113 CONG. REC. 24662, 24664 (1967).
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the view that the legislation was designed to fill "a rather large gap
in the securities statutes," Manuel Cohen, then Chairman of the
Securities Exchange Commission, so testified before the Senate
n0
Subcommittee on Securities.
In highlighting the objectives of the proposed legislation, Senator Williams focused primarily on the interests of the shareholder,
but he also expressed the viewpoint that the legislation was neither
intended to protect entrenched management nor to give unfair advantage to the tender offeror, and he continued to assert this notion
throughout the legislative process:
I have taken extreme care with this legislation to balance the
scales equally to protect the legitimate interests of the corporation, management, and shareholders without unduly impeding cash takeover bids. Every effort has been made to
avoid tipping the balance of regulatory burden in favor of
management or in favor of the offeror. The purpose of this
bill is to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of
stockholders while at the same time providing the offeror
and management equal opportunity to fairly present their
case. 41 Experience . . . has amply demonstrated that the
disclosure requirements of the Federal securities acts 42are an
aid to legitimate business transactions, not a hindrance ....
We have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales in
or in favor of the person making the
favor of management
43
bids.
takeover
Specifically, the Williams Act created disclosure requirements
44
which applied prior to the commencement of a tender offer. The
most significant portions of this legislation added §§ 13(d) and 14(d)
40. In his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee, Mr. Cohen impliedly
indicated that the SEC supported the objective announced by Senator Williams.
Mr. Cohen stated: "[Tlhe general approach . . . of this bill is to provide the
investor, the person who is required to make a decision, an opportunity to examine
and to assess the relevant facts. . . ." Hearings on S. 510 before the Subcommittee

on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st

Sess. 200 (1967).
41. This language is also found in both the House and Senate Reports. S.
REP. No. 550, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter Senate Report]; H.R. REP.

No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S.

CODE CONG.

NEWS 2811 [hereinafter House Report].
42. 113 CONG. REC. 854, 854-5 (1967) (emphasis added).
43. 113 CONG. REC. 24662, 24664 (1978) (emphasis added).

44. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (d)-(e), 78n (d)-(f) (1982).

& ADMIN.
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to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 45 These sections require
a tender offeror to provide shareholders of the target with timely
and detailed information when the offeror acquires a set percentage
of the target's shares or begins acquiring shares as part of a plan to
4
obtain control.

6

45. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78KK (1982).
46. These requirements, particularly § 13(d), mandate any person acquiring
more than five percent of certain classes of securities of particular publicly
held
corporations to file a statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission
within 10 days after acquiring the securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982);
see
also 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1986). The statement must contain specific information
concerning the tender offeror, and the purpose behind the offeror's tender offer.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A)-(E) (1982). The purpose of this disclosure statement
is to provide management and shareholders of the target company with detailed
information concerning large purchases of stock, which are often indicators
of
takeover attempts. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982).
Section 13(d) is applicable to the securities of corporations registered under §
12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d). Such
a
corporation is required to register its equity securities under § 12 if: (1) they are
to
be listed on a national securities exchange; or (2) the class of equity securities
is
held by 500 or more persons and the corporation has total assets exceeding
one
million dollars. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(1)(a), 78(l)(g)(1)(A), 78(l)(g)(1)(B) (1982).
In
1982, the SEC increased this one million dollar figure to three million dollars
to
account for inflation.
Section 14(d) governs formal tender offers which would result in the acquirer
having more than five percent of the equity securities of a publicly held corporation.
See id. The disclosure requirements under this section are substantially similar
to
those under § 13(d). See id. Such disclosures must be made to the Securities
and
Exchange Commission and the target company no later than the date that material
soliciting or requesting tender offers is first published or sent or given to
any
security holders. See id; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a) (1986).
In addition to the "procedural" disclosure requirements, § 14(d) also contains
three "substantive" provisions which were designed to give individual shareholders
support in their decisions whether to tender their shares. Section 14(d)(5)
gives
shareholders the right to withdraw tendered shares during specified time periods.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982). Shareholders who tender their shares
withdraw them (1) during the first 15 business days after the commencement ofmay
the
tender offer, and (2) if the offeror has not purchased their shares, any time
after
60 days from the commencement of the offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982);
17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1986). The Williams Act originally allowed shareholders
to withdraw tendered shares for the first seven business days following commencement of the tender offer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5). In 1979, the SEC expanded
these withdrawal rights, lengthening the period to 15 days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d7(a)(l) (1986). Furthermore, if the shares have not been purchased, shareholders
may withdraw tendered shares for 10 business days following the commencement
of a competing bid. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(2) (1986). Section 14(d)(6) states
that acquisitions must be made on a pro rata basis from each tendering shareholder,

1988:1871

BEYOND MITE-CTS v. DYNAMICS

Congress was committed to a policy of neutrality in contests for

control. 7 Legislators were convinced "that takeover bids should not
be discouraged because they serve a useful purpose in providing a
'48 This policy of
check on entrenched but inefficient management.

"evenhandedness" represented a conviction that neither side in the
contest should be extended additional advantages vis-A-vis the inves-

would be "in a
tor, who, if furnished with adequate information,
49
choice."
informed
own
his
position to make
To determine whether state legislation is void for encroaching

upon a federally regulated area, an analysis which focuses 0on the

legislative purpose for adopting the federal law is necessary. Congress did not explicitly prohibit states from regulating takeovers; it

left to the courts the determination of5 whether a particular state

statute conflicts with the Williams Act. A state statute is void to2
valid federal statute.1
the extent that it actually conflicts with a
However, a state law is also said to conflict with a federal law when
and
the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
3 Thereexecution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
§
if more shares are tendered than the offeror sought to acquire. 15 U.S.C.
of
share
proportionate
a
shareholder
tendering
each
ensuring
By
(1982).
78n(d)(6)
of a
any premium between the per share tender offer price and the market price
hasty
a
make
to
having
from
share of stock, this provision prevents the shareholder
The
tender, and allows the individual more time to make an informed decision.
tendered
shares
those
of
only
acceptance
rata
pro
required
originally
Williams Act
within 10 days following the commencement of the offer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6)
(1982). In December, 1982, the SEC adopted a rule requiring pro rata acceptance
(1986).
at any time during the period of the tender offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8
for all
price
same
the
pay
must
offeror
tender
the
that
Section 14(d)(7) provides
shares purchased; if the offering price is increased before the end of the offer,
the
those who already have tendered their shares must receive the benefit of
tender
the
minimum,
a
at
Finally,
(1982).
increased price. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7)
offer must remain open for at least 20 business days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a)
(1986).
47. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
48. Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982).
49. Id. at 633-34 (emphasis added).
50. See id. at 636-37.
51. See id. at 631.
52. MITE, 457 U.S. at 631. A conflict will be found "where compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility." Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
53. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 9

fore, when a state statute frustrates the objectives of the Williams
Act in some substantial way, it is void.14
IV.

EARLY JUDICIAL DECISIONS-THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO STATE TENDER OFFER LEGISLATION

In Gibbons v. Ogden," the Supreme Court struggled with the
tension between state and federal regulation of commerce. The
commerce clause states: "Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate [c]ommerce . . . among the several States .... ,,56 In explaining
the power to regulate commerce, the Court stated "that the people
intended, in establishing the constitution, to transfer from the several
states to a general government, those high and important powers
over commerce, which, in their exercise were to maintain a uniform
and general system. ' 57 Congress' power to regulate commerce is
exclusive whenever the subjects of regulation "are in their nature
national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation
''58

The commerce clause grants a specific power to Congress to
regulate commerce, while implicitly limiting state power to do so. 9
Indeed, the reason for the existence of the commerce clause is "to
create an area of free trade among the several States. "60 The modern
test articulating this limitation was set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.61 Pike established a balancing test weighing the local benefits
promoted by the particular state legislation against the burdens
imposed upon interstate commerce. 62 Another case often relied upon
by parties attacking the validity of state statutes impacting upon
54.
55.
56.
57.

See MITE, 457 U.S. at 632.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 13 (1824).

58. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).

59. See Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319-21. See also Lewis v. BT
Inv.

Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980).
60. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co.,

322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944),

approval in A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370 (1976).
61. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).

cited with

62. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The court stated
the general rule which emerged from the case as follows: "Where the
statute
regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local
benefits." Id.
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interstate commerce is Southern Pacific Railroad v. Arizona.63 In

Southern Pacific, the Court recognized that:

When the regulation of matters of local concern is local in
character and effect, and its impact on the national commerce
does not seriously interfere with its operation, and the con-

sequent incentive to deal with them nationally is slight, such

has been generally held to be within state authorregulation
ity. 64

Both the commerce clause and the preemption doctrine, which

65
is derived from the supremacy clause, have been used to invalidate

overreaching state statutes. 66 Under the supremacy clause, a state

law is invalid if it directly conflicts with federal law, making com67
pliance with both impossible. The preemption doctrine extends this
concept, so that a state law may be invalid, and therefore preempted
by federal law, when such state law merely "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment 6and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress." s
The Supreme Court has adopted a case-by-case approach to the

preemption issue, making a determination about whether a state law

will be preempted difficult. 69 The Court has tended to uphold state

law under the preemption doctrine in the absence of some congres70
sional intent to preempt state law. This intent may be found in
63. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).

64. Southern Pacific Railroad v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945).
65. The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to'the Contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. CO ST. art. VI,

§ 2.

66. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); California v. Zook,
336 U.S. 725 (1949); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) . For a
discussion of the preemption doctrine and the supremacy clause, see Freeman,

Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 630
(1972); Comment, A Conceptual Refinement of the Doctrine of FederalPreemption,
22 J. PUB. L. 391, 396 (1973).
67. Id.
68. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
69. See Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21
DE PAUL L. REV. 630, 632-33 (1972); Comment, A Conceptual Refinement of the
Doctrine of FederalPreemption, 22 J. PUB. L. 391 (1973).
70. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974);
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express provisions, or may be inferred from a legislative scheme 71 or
from the need to promote a uniform national policy.72 However, the
mere existence of federal legislation is insufficient to preempt state
73
law .
After the enactment of the Williams Act, the constitutionality
of state takeover legislation was first addressed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Great Western United
Corp. v. Kidwell. 74 In Great Western, the court invalidated the Idaho
Takeover Statute under the preemption doctrine and the commerce
clause. 75 Under the Idaho Statute, both the Director of the Idaho
Department of Finance and the management of a target company
were to receive advance notice of a tender offer, 76 and both could
request an informational hearing concerning such offer. 77 The state
argued that the legislation was designed to protect investors by
"involving the directors and officers of the target in the evaluation
of a tender offer." '78 The court held the Idaho statute was preempted
by the Williams Act because the "market approach" adopted by
Congress and the "fiduciary approach" adopted by Idaho were
incompatible. 79
The court also examined the Idaho statute under the commerce
clause. The State argued that the statute fulfilled the legitimate
purpose of protecting incumbent management and investors, and
preserving local industry.80 The court stated that if the purpose of
the statute in favoring management was to prevent the removal of
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); New York Dep't of Social Serv. v.

Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132 (1963).
71. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). See also infra note 286.
72. See Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
73. See Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). Some
type of conflict between state and federal law is necessary. See supra notes 66-68
and accompanying text.
74. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v.

Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). See generally, Note, The

Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Response to Great Western, 53
N.Y.U. L. REV. 872 (1978).
75. Great Western, 577 F.2d at 1279, 1286.
76. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(1) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
77. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(4) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
78. Great Western, 577 F.2d at 1279.
79. Id.

80. Id. at 1282-83.
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8
local business to other states, such purpose would be invalid. The
court ultimately held that the burdens created by the Idaho statute's
extraterritorial regulation of tender offers were not outweighed,
under the Pike test,8 2 by the legitimate benefits which the Idaho
takeover law provided.8 3
84
A year later, in AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, (hereinafter
AMCA) a federal district court, citing the decision that overturned
86
Great Western,85 upheld the Ohio Takeover Act against similar
constitutional challenges. 7 The Ohio statute required the offeror to
announce a takeover bid and disclose the terms of the bid twenty
88
days before the commencement of the offer, required the filing of
8 9 permitted the Ohio Division
a comprehensive disclosure statement,
of Securities to call a hearing concerning such offer at its discretion
90
or at the request of incumbent management, and provided for
91
administrative inquiry into the fairness of the tender offer.
The court in AMCA based its decision in large part on Congress'
intention to protect investors through enactment of the Williams
Act. 92 The court indicated the Williams Act "accords no 'right' to
a tender offeror to make an offer, much less to succeed in consummating it." 93 In finding that the Ohio Act made a greater contribu94
tion to investor protection than the Williams Act, the court held
95
that the state law did not conflict with the federal act.
Under its commerce clause analysis of the Ohio Act, the court
further held that in light of the Pike test, the Act was not unconstitutional. 96 The court indicated that tender offers are essentially
internal affairs transactions, and because the Ohio Act regulated the

81. Id. at 1282.
82. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
83. Great Western, 577 F.2d at 1285-86.
84. 482 F. Supp. 929, 934 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
85. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
86. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Baldwin 1978).
87. AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 941 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
88. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.(B)(1) (Baldwin 1978). The 20 day notice
requirement was later held unconstitutional in Canadian Pac. Enter. (U.S.) Inc. v.
Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192, 1204 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
89. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(3) (Baldwin 1978).
90. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(1)(a)-(c) (Baldwin 1978).
91. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(4) (Baldwin 1978).
92. AMCA, 482 F. Supp. at 936.
93. Id. at 937 (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977)).
94. AMCA, 482 F. SUpp. at 938.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 941.
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internal affairs of its corporations, it served a legitimate local
purpose. 97 Weighing this interest against any burdens which the Act
placed on nonresident shareholders and other states, the court held
that such burdens were outweighed by the benefits provided by the
Ohio Act. 9
The district court's reasoning in AMCA was not well received
by other courts. In Dart Indus. Inc. v. Conrad,99 an Indiana district
court held the Delaware Tender Offers Act unconstitutional under
the supremacy clause and the commerce clause. 100 The court held the
Delaware statute was preempted (by the Williams Act) because of
its requirement that notice of a tender offer be given to the target
0 The
company, but not to shareholders.°'
court indicated the statute
had the potential to seriously delay an interstate tender offer.10 2
Additionally, the court found the Delaware statute was extra-territorial in purpose and effect, and therefore had a significant impact
on interstate commerce. 03 Thus, the court held that because of the
significant burden which the statute imposed on the national securities market, it failed the Pike test. 04 The court concluded that
tender offers serve beneficial economic functions, and, by the adoption of the Williams Act, Congress intended to create a legislative
scheme which would favor neither the offeror nor incumbent management and provide investors with sufficient information to make
their own decisions whether to tender shares. 05
In Crane Co. v. Lam, 0 6 the court examined the Pennsylvania
Takeover Disclosure Law, which contained provisions similar to
those in the Idaho statute analyzed in Great Western and the
Delaware statute examined in Dart. The defendant, the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Securities Commission, argued that the
Pennsylvania statute protected investors and served to regulate the
internal affairs of domestic corporations.0 7 However, the court
found the purported local benefits which the statute provided were
97. Id. at 939.
98. Id. at 939-40.
99. 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
100. Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 14 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
101. See Dart, 462 F. Supp. at 10-12, 14. This provision of the Delaware
statute can be found in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §203(a)(1) (Supp. 1982).
102. See Dart, 462 F. Supp. at 11.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 13-14.
105. Id. at 12.
106. 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Penn. 1981).
107. Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782, 789 (E.D. Penn. 1981).
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outweighed by the burdens imposed on interstate commerce: the

statute's potential to cause delay in the tender offer process, its
application to nonresident shareholders, and the risk of conflict with
other state tender offer legislation. 08
Most of the state takeover statutes created after the adoption
of the Williams Act generally applied to transactions between the

tender offeror and the target company's shareholders if the target
0 9 The
corporation fit the statute's definition of a local enterprise.

effect of most of the statutes' broad definitions of a local enterprise
was to extend the regulation of such statutes to transactions which

took place wholly outside the boundaries of the particular state. The
extra-territorial effect of these statutes, together with other uncon-

stitutional provisions contained in them, resulted in the invalidation

of many of these statutes by federal courts.110 The Supreme Court
eventually addressed, but did not resolve, the tension between federal

and state power resulting from the enactment of state takeover
legislation.

V.

EDGAR V.

MITE CoRP.

MITE Corp. and its wholly-owned subsidiary, MITE Holdings,

Inc., were Delaware corporations with their principal offices in
Connecticut."' Chicago Rivet & Machine Co. was a publicly held
Illinois corporation." 2 MITE initiated a cash tender offer for all
outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet at a premium over the prevailing
market price." 3 Apparently knowing its tender offer did not comply

108. Id. at 789-92.
109. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.52-10 (1979) (repealed
1983). "Target company" means:
a corporation or other issuer of securities (1) of which 10%o of the
outstanding securities of the class of its equity securities which is the
subject of a take-over offer is held of record by security-holders located
in this State as determined by post office address as shown on the records
of the issuer, or (2) which meets any two of the following conditions: (a)
has its principal executive office in this State; (b) is organized under the
laws of this State; (c) has at least 10%70 of its stated capital and paid-in
surplus represented in this State.
110. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980); MITE
Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp.
191 (D. Nev. 1981).
111. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 626 (1982).
112. Id. at 627.
113. Id. at 628. Chicago Rivet had 866,262 shares of publicly traded common
stock outstanding and 2,181 shareholders of record, 589 of whom were Illinois
residents, collectively owning 377,395 common shares. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633
F.2d 486, 488 (7th Cir. 1980).
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with the Illinois Business Take-Over Act," l 4 MITE sought a declaratory judgment that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams
Act and violated the commerce clause." 5 In addition, MITE sought
a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the Illinois Secretary of State from enforcing
the Illinois Act."1 6 The preliminary injunction was issued."' The
district court then entered final judgment declaring the Illinois Act
was preempted by the Williams Act." 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed."19 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, 20 and
affirmed.' 2
A.

RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE "ILLINOIS BUSINESS TAKE-OVER
ACT"

The Illinois Business Take-Over Act'

22 required

a tender offeror 23

to notify the Secretary of State and the target company

24

of its

114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras. 137.51 to 137.70 (1979).
115. MITE, 457 U.S. at 628.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 629.
118. Id. Accordingly, the district court permanently enjoined enforcement of
the Illinois statute against MITE. Id.
119. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 503 (7th Cir. 1980). The appellate
court agreed with the district court that several provisions of the Illinois Act were
preempted by the Williams Act and the Illinois Act unduly burdened interstate
commerce. See MITE, 633 F.2d at 502-03.
120. 451 U.S. 968 (1981).
121. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630 (1982). In making its decision,
the Supreme Court reviewed the relevant portions of the Illinois Business TakeOver Act in light of the commerce clause and the preemption doctrine, which is
implicit in the supremacy clause. Id. at 634-46.
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras. 137.51 to 137.70 (1979) (repealed
1983).
123. "Offeror" means "a person who makes or in any way participates in
making a take-over offer, and includes all affiliates of that person." Id. at para.
137.52-5. "Person" means "a natural person, corporation, association, partnership, trust, group, syndicate or other entity." Id. at 137.52-6. "Take-over offer"
means:
[T]he offer to acquire or the acquisition of any equity security of a target
company, pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders,
if after acquisition the offeror would be, directly or indirectly, a beneficial
owner of more than 50o of the class of the outstanding equity securities
of the target company which is the subject of the take-over offer.
Id. at para. 137.52-9.
124. For a definition of "target company," see supra note 109.
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intent to make a tender offer, and the terms of the offer, twenty

days before the offer became effective. 125 During that time the
offeror could not communicate its offer to the shareholders, but the

target company was free to disseminate information to its shareholders concerning the impending offer. 126 The Act also required
1 27
any takeover offer to be registered with the Secretary of State.
The Illinois Act allowed the Secretary of State to call a hearing

with respect to any tender offer subject to the Act; and the offer

could not proceed until the hearing was completed.1 2 1 The secretary
could call a hearing at any time prior to the commencement of the
offer, and the Act provided no deadline for completion of the
hearing. 129 Incumbent management was also entitled to request a
hearing, and again, if the Secretary of State deemed the hearing
necessary, the offer could not proceed until the hearing was completed. 13 0
The Illinois Act also required the Secretary of State to deny the
registration of a takeover offer if the Secretary found that the offer
"fail[ed] to provide full and fair disclosure to the offerees .. .or
that the take-over [was] inequitable. ...,31
B.

THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

1. Preemption analysis
The Court focused its inquiry on whether the Illinois Act
frustrated the objectives of the Williams Act.' 3 2 It first recognized
125. Id. at para. 137.54(E).
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.54(A), (B), (E) (1979) (repealed
1983) (as interpreted in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634-35 (1982)).
127. The offeror was required to provide the Secretary with a disclosure
statement. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.54(A), (C) (1979).
128. Id. at para. 137.57(A), (B).
129. See id. at para. 137.57(C), (D).
130. See id. at para. 137.57(A), (B). The Secretary of State "shall" call a
hearing if the Secretary deems it necessary or if within 15 business days after the
date of filing the registration statement a written request for a hearing is submitted
to the Secretary:
by a person or persons who are located in this State as determined by post
office address as shown on the records of the target company and who
hold of record or beneficially, or both, at least 1007o of the outstanding
shares of any class of equity securities which is the subject of the takeover offer.
Id. at para. 137.57 (A).
131. Id. at para. 137.57(E) (emphasis added).
132. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632 (1982).
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that, in adopting the Williams Act, Congress intended to protect
investors.' The Court went on to state that " it [was] also crystal
clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the investor was to
avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder."'3 4 The
Court indicated that Congress' policy of "evenhandedness ... 135
represented a conviction that neither side in the contest should be
extended additional advantages vis-A-vis the investor, who if furnished with adequate information would be in a position to make
his own informed choice."

36

Next, the Court examined the validity of the "20-day precommencement notification requirement" contained in the Act.'3 7 Recognizing that this provision delayed' the commencement of the tender
offer, contrary to Congress' intentions, the Court stated that "the
precommencement notification provision frustrates the objectives of
the Williams Act."'3 9 Scrutinizing the hearing provision 40 of the
Illinois Act, which effectively gave the Secretary of State and incumbent management the power to delay a tender offer,' 4 ' the Court
concluded that "[tihe potential for delay upset the balance struck
by Congress by favoring management at the expense of stockholders.' "142

133. Id. at 633.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id. (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 31 (1977)).
136. Id. at 633-34 (emphasis and footnote added).
137. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.54(E) (1979) (repealed 1983)
for this provision. The Court stated:
[B]y providing the target company with additional time within which to
take steps to combat the offer, the precommencement notification provisions furnish incumbent management with a powerful tool to combat
tender offers, perhaps to the detriment of the stockholders who will not
have an offer before them during this period.
MITE, 457 U.S. at 635 (footnote omitted).
138. Delay, according to the Securities and Exchange Commission, allows a
target company to:
(1) repurchase its own securities; (2) announce dividend increases or stock
splits; (3) issue additional shares of stock; (4) acquire other companies to
produce an antitrust violation should the tender offer succeed; (5) arrange
a defensive merger; (6) enter into restrictive loan agreements; and (7)
institute litigation challenging the tender offer.
Id. at 638 n.10.
139. Id. at 635.
140. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.57(A), (B) (1979) (repealed 1983).

141. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639.
142. Id.
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Finally, the Court reviewed the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act to
the extent it allowed the Secretary of State to pass judgment on the
substantive fairness of a tender offer. 143 The Court agreed with the
Court of Appeals that the Williams Act and its legislative history
indicate Congress intended for investors to retain the right to make
their own decisions regarding whether to tender their shares. 144 In
summation, the Court quoted the Seventh Circuit: 'The state . . .
offers investor protection at the expense of investor autonomy-an
45
approach quite in conflict with that adopted by Congress.""1
2.

Commerce clause analysis

The Supreme Court in MITE stated that the Illinois Act violated
the commerce clause for two reasons' 46 First, unless its terms were
satisfied, the Act directly regulated and prevented interstate tender
offers which generated interstate monetary transactions. 47 Second,
the burden imposed upon commerce was excessive in light of the
48
local interests the Act purported to promote.
A tender offer for the stock of a publicly held corporation is
ordinarily communicated "by the use of the mails or. other means
of interstate commerce" to shareholders throughout the United
States and outside the United States. 149 The Court recognized that
the use of these interstate facilities by offerees in accepting the offer
would also result in transactions occurring across state lines. 50 In
fact, the Court stated that "[t]hese transactions would themselves
be interstate commerce."' 5 '
Unless the provisions of the Illinois Act were met,5 2 the Act
53
prevented MITE from making its offer to the target company' s'
shareholders residing in Illinois and other states. 5 4 The Act applied
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 640 (quoting MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir.
1980)).
146. MITE, 457 U.S. at 640.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 641.
150. Id.at 642.
151. MITE, 457 U.S. at 640.
152. The provisions of the Act were not met by MITE. Id. at 628.
153. The target company was Chicago Rivet & Machine Co.
154. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.54 (1979) (repealed 1983)
(registration requirements).
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to every tender offer for a corporation satisfying any two of the
following requirements:' (1)the corporation had its principal executive office in Illinois; (2) the corporation was organized under the
laws of the State of Illinois; or (3) the corporation had at least ten
percent of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented in
Illinois. This meant the Act could have applied to a proposed tender
6
offer which would not have effected a single Illinois shareholder.1
Therefore, the Court held the statute was a direct restraint on
interstate commerce and had a "sweeping extra-territorial effect.' 51 7
The Court also held the Act unconstitutional under the Pike
balancing test.' 58 The most obvious burden the Court found the
Illinois Act to impose on interstate commerce was the "nationwide
reach" which, if the statute was upheld, would give Illinois the
power to regulate tender offers involving no Illinois residents. 5 9 In
the words of the Court: "The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to block a nationwide tender offer are substantial.
Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at
' 60
a premium.'
After examining the burdens the Illinois Act imposed upon
interstate commerce, the Court examined the purported benefits.
Secretary of State Edgar claimed the Illinois Act furthered two
legitimate local interests.' 6' He argued that Illinois, by enacting this
legislation, sought to protect resident holders of equity securities,
and that the Act merely regulated the internal affairs of Illinois
corporations in which the State had a legitimate interest. 62 The
Court held these purported interests were insufficient to outweigh
the burdens which the Illinois Act imposed on interstate commerce. 163
Reasserting the fact that the Illinois Act had a seriously burdensome
effect on out-of-state transactions, the Court stated that "there [was]
nothing to be weighed in the balance to sustain the law.' ' 64

The Court also rejected the state's "internal affairs" argu-

ment.' 65 According to the Court, that argument was of little use to
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.52-10 (1979) (repealed 1983).
156. MITE, 457 U.S. at 642.

157. Id.
158. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).

159. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 644.
Id.
Id.

164. MITE,

457 U.S. at 643.

165. "The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which
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the state in the context of tender offers. 166 "Tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and do not
1 61
themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company.
The assertion that the "internal affairs" doctrine is a justification
for the Illinois Act seems increasingly absurd 6 in light of the fact
that the Act applied to tender offers for any corporation of which
ten percent of the outstanding shares were held by Illinois residenis. 169 The Court finally held that the Illinois Act imposed substantial burdens on interstate commerce which were not outweighed
by any significant local benefits, and accordingly held the Act
71
invalid 10° under the commerce clause.'
C.

POST-MITE DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE REGULATION

Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in MITE, state
legislatures have responded by adopting new takeover legislation
designed to avoid the unconstitutional effects of certain provisions
in the Illinois Business Take-over Act. 172 States which have enacted
4
73
post-MITE takeover statutes include Maryland,' Pennsylvania,1
recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation's
internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors and shareholders . . ." since a corpo-

ration could encounter conflicting demands if its internal affairs were regulated by
more than one state. Id. at 645. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 302 comment b (1971).
166. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 645.
169. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.52-10(1) (1979) (repealed
1983). The Act thus applied to foreign corporations, in which the State of Illinois
had no real interest.
170. The Illinois Business Take-Over Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras.
137.51 to 137.70 (1979), was later repealed by the Illinois General Assembly in
Illinois Public Act 83-365, § 1, which took effect Sept. 14, 1983.
171. MITE, 457 U.S. at 646.
172. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras. 137.50 to 137.70 (1979) (repealed
1983).
173. As observed by one set of commentators:
Maryland has amended its General Corporation Law to adopt a fair price/
supermajority vote requirement, for interested mergers, the 'effect' of
which is applicable to Maryland corporations unless they act affirmatively
by an 80% stockholder vote (including a 1/3 class vote of disinterested
stockholders) to eliminate the provision.
Sparks, Hamermesh, Nachbar, Grimm and Houghton, State Law Considerations
in Undertaking Acquisitions: Delaware, 1 ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS 1987: TACTICS,
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New York, "' Ohio, 7 6 and Indiana.177 Since the enactment of these

TECHNIQUES AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 437, 497-98 (Prac. L. Inst.)[hereinafter
ACQUISITIONS]. See MD. CoPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 1-102(a), 3-601 to 3-603
(1985 & Supp. 1986). Maryland's statute is of the type known as a "fair price
statute." Such a statute is designed to give minority shareholders a reasonable or fair
price for their holdings. For a detailed description of this type of statute and a list
of states that have adopted such legislation, see R. WINTER, STATE TAKEOVER
STATUTES AND POISON PILLS

§ 4, at 41 (1988) [hereinafter

WINTER].

174. The Pennsylvania Act is described as follows:
In December of 1983 Pennsylvania adopted a measure apparently designed
to curtail 'greenmail' (the purchase of a large block of stock in a target
company's securities in an attempt to coerce management into repurchasing
the shares at a premium) and discourage partial tender offers. Under the
Pennsylvania law, once a stockholder purchases 30% of the shares of a
publicly traded corporation, the other stockholders can require the 30%
stockholder to purchase their shares at a 'fair value' determined by the
Pennsylvania courts. (The law does not have an opt-out provision for
companies who don't desire the protection afforded by the law.) This
statute falls within a constitutional 'grey area,' as it burdens the right of
third parties to accumulate stock but invokes a remedy akin to that in
traditional state law appraisal statutes.
The Pennsylvania act also provides that directors and officers in discharging their duties may consider the best interests of the corporation and the
effects of any action on employees, customers and suppliers, communities
in which the corporation is located 'and all other pertinent factors.' This
language, aimed at trying a board's defensive actions to issues of local
'social responsibility,' is an apparent effort to overcome MITE by emphasizing the 'nexus' between local and state concerns and the operation of
the corporation.
ACQUISITIONS at 498. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1901 to 1910 (Purdon Supp.
1988). Pennsylvania's statute is also a "fair price" statute. See WINTER, supra note
173, § 4, at 41.
175. The New York Act is described as follows:
On December 16, 1985, Governor Cuomo signed into law a bill amending
the Business Corporation Law (the 'BCL') of New York. Governor Cuomo
stated that the law is 'aimed at abuses in certain takeovers, but isn't
designed to protect entrenched management.' The Wall Street Journal,
Dec. 17, 1985, at 39. In particular, the statute is aimed at impeding highly
leveraged takeovers in which acquirors use high-yield, high-risk junk
securities to gain control of a corporation and then pay the costs of merger
using the target corporation's own assets.
ACQUISITIONS at 499. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986). New
York's statute is of the type known as a "business combination statute." This type
of statute places limitations on how and when an offeror can merge or combine
with the target. For a detailed description of such legislation and a list of states

1988:1871

BEYOND MITE-CTS v. DYNAMICS

post-MITE takeover statutes, the Supreme Court has examined the
Indiana statute, 178 again bringing the issue of the constitutional

viability of such statutes into question.

STATE
VI. POST-MITE JUDICIAL DECISIONS: CHALLENGES TO
COURT'S
SUPREME
THE
OF
LIGHT
IN
TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
DECISION

After the Supreme Court's decision in MITE, but before CTS,
to avoid the
several states enacted tender offer legislation designed
179 As a result, lower
constitutional infirmities of the Illinois statute.
federal courts again were called upon to resolve claims that state
80 Several courts relied upon
legislation conflicted with federal law.
2
8
1
1 they examined.
MITE in invalidating the first generation statutes1

3
Second generation statutes' attempted to control the tender offer
8 4
domestic corporations,
of
affairs
internal
the
regulating
by
process
a goal which seemingly was within the bounds of the commerce
clause.8 5 However, the lower federal court decisions following MITE

173,
that have adopted a "business combination statute," see WINTER, supra note
§ 3, at 27.
176. The Ohio statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01 to 1701.831 (Anderson 1985), is essentially the same as the Indiana statute examined by the Supreme
(Anderson
Court in CTS. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01 to 1701.83
1987).
Supp.
(West
23-1-42-11
to
23-1-42-1
§§
ANN.
1985) with IND. CODE

177. The Indiana Control Shares Acquisition Act, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1of this
42-1 to 23-1-42-11 (West Supp. 1987), is discussed in the following text
a list
and
statutes
acquisition"
share
"control
note. For a detailed description of
2, at
§
173,
note
supra
WINTER,
see
legislation,
such
adopted
of states that have
beyond
is
15. A detailed discussion of all types of state anti-takeover legislation
What
the scope of this article. For a good discussion of state legislation, see Hook,
(1988).
312-22
293,
REV.
U.L.
ILL.
is Wrong with Takeover Legislation, 8 N.
178. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
179. Such legislation is often referred to as the "second generation takeover
statutes." See, e.g., Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover
Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 203 (1987) [hereinafter Second Generation].

180. See, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th
Cir. 1983); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983); Martin-Marietta
v.
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982); National City Lines, Inc.
LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
181. First generation statutes are those which were enacted prior to the MITE
decision.
182. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
183. Those state takeover statutes enacted after MITE.
184. See Second Generation, supra note 179, at 242.
185. See Second Generation, supra note 179, at 212.
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seemed to remove much hope for first generation statutes, and later
cast doubt on the validity of second generation statutes.
One of the federal appellate court decisions which was most
outspoken about the constitutional invalidity of the first generation
state statute it examined was National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC
Corp.116 In National City, the Eighth Circuit held the Missouri
Takeover Bid Disclosure Act unconstitutional under the commerce
clause and the supremacy clause.' The court held that because
"there [were] no significant distinctions between the Illinois and
Missouri Takeover Acts," the Missouri Act was invalid under the

MITE decision."'8
The court also examined the statute to determine if it stood "as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress,",9 and therefore whether the statute
was preempted by the Williams Act. 90 The court found that not
only did the Missouri statute frustrate the purposes and objectives
of the Williams Act, but it also directly conflicted with applicable
federal statutes and regulations.'9, The specific provisions of the
Missouri statute which the court examined were those providing for
a twenty-day waiting period after the offeror filed detailed disclosure
statements both with the state and the target company, a hearing on
the adequacy of the disclosures in the registration statement, and a
period during which tendering shareholders might withdraw their
shares which was in excess of the period provided by the Williams
Act.' 92 The court held the Missouri Act discriminated against tender
offerors in favor of management 93 and basically disrupted "the
neutrality essential to the proper operation of the market approach
of protecting investors utilized by the Williams Act.' ' 94
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in Martin-MariettaCorp. v. Bendix Corp. 95 also cast consid-

erable doubt on the constitutionality of first generation statutes.
Although supremacy clause challenges were made to the Michigan

186. 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
187. National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1134-35 (8th
Cir.
1982).

188. Id. at 1128.

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 1128-29 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
Id. at 1129.
Id. at 1132.
National City, 687 F.2d at 1130-32.
Id.at 1133.

194. Id.

195. 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982).
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statute examined in this case, 196 the court addressed only the commerce clause issue.197 The court found the Michigan statute indirectly
burdened interstate commerce because it defeated the tender offers
provide a
of nonresidents when their tenders were necessary to
198 Following
offer.
tender
the
satisfy
sufficient number of shares to
the approach taken by the Supreme Court in MITE, the court
weighed the burdens imposed upon interstate commerce by the
Michigan statute against the local benefits which the statute provided. 199 The court held that to the extent the Michigan statute
interfered with nationwide tender offers and indirectly burdened
interstate commerce, it violated the commerce clause."
The Virginia Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act, which contained
' 20 1
provisions regulating "creeping tender offers, 20 2was examined by
the Fourth Circuit in Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw. The court, concentrating mainly on the statute's extra-territorial effect and the
burdens which the statute imposed on interstate commerce, determined that the provisions of the statute violated the commerce
clause. 203 The court indicated that the broad applicability of the
Virginia Act and the resulting burden on interstate commerce20 4 were
still not offset by the local benefits provided by the statute. The
court stated: "[Tihe Virginia statute, unlike the Illinois statute
considered in MITE, is limited to Virginia companies. It is, however,
not limited to transactions between residents of Virginia .

. 205

The court explained that although the burden imposed on interstate
commerce by the Virginia Act was not as significant as the burden
imposed by the Illinois statute, the Virginia Act was invalid20because
benefits. 6
the burdens it imposed were not outweighed by its
196.
1982).
197.
198.
199.

Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 559 (6th Cir.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 565-69.

200. Id. at 568.

201. A "creeping tender offer" is essentially a purchase plan whereby the
offeror purchases the stock of the target company on the open market over an
extended period of time. See generally Note, Developments in Corporate Takeover
Techniques: Creeping Tender Offers, Lockup Arrangements, and Standstill Agreements, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1095 (1982). The Williams Act applies to such
tender offers. See Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 580 (4th Cir. 1983).
202. 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983).
203. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 579-82 (4th Cir. 1983).

204. See id. at 579-82.
205. Id. at 579-80.
206. Id. at 582.
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The MITE decision, and the lower federal court decisions that
followed it, essentially quieted most of the disputes concerning the
constitutionality of first generation state takeover legislation. However, the MITE decision began to be applied to second generation
statutes when challenges were made against such statutes in the
federal courts. 20 7 Again, most courts used the MITE analysis to
invalidate these statutes. 20 However, the Supreme Court once again
addressed the purported conflict between state and federal takeover
laws in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.20 9 CTS arguably
has incorrectly improved the constitutional outlook for second generation state takeover legislation.
VII.

CTS CORP. v.

DYNAMICS

CORP. OF AMERICA

The object of dispute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America2 10 was Indiana's Control Shares Acquisition Act. 2 1' Dynamics Corporation of America owned 9.6% of the common stock of
CTS Corporation.212 Six days after the Indiana Act became effective,
Dynamics announced a tender offer for one million shares in CTS,
acquisition of 'which would have' escalated Dynamics' ownership
interest in CTS to 27.5%.213 Subsequently, the board of directors of
CTS elected to be governed by the provisions of the Act. 214

207. See infra note 208.
208. See, e.g., Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th
Cir.
1986), vac. sub nom., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct.
1637
(1987); Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.
1986),
rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
209. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
210. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
211. On March 4, 1986, the Governor of Indiana signed into law a revised
Indiana Business Corporation Law. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-17-1 to 23-1-17-5
(West Supp. 1988). That law included the Control Shares Act (hereinafter
the
Indiana Act or the Act). See IND. CODE. ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to 23-1-42-11
(West
Supp. 1988). Effective August 1, 1987, the Indiana Act applies to any corporation
incorporated in Indiana, unless the corporation amends its articles of incorporation
or bylaws to opt out of the Act. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-7-1-3(a) (West Supp.
1988)
(repealed by Pub. L. 149-1986, § 65); § 23-1-42-5 and 23-1-42-9 (West Supp.
1988).
Before that date, any Indiana corporation was allowed to opt into the
Act by
resolution of its board of directors. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-17-3(b) (West
Supp.
1988).
212. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
213. Id.
214. Id. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-17-3 (West Supp. 1988) (application
requirements for Indiana corporations).
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Dynamics alleged that the Indiana Act was preempted by the
2 16
Williams Act,215 and violated the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution. 2 7 Dynamics sought a temporary restraining
and declaratory relief against CTS's
order, a preliminary injunction,
21 8
Act.
Indiana
use of the
A.

THE INDIANA CONTROL SHARES ACQUISITION ACT

' 21 9 of
The Indiana Act applies to what it terms "control shares
22 The Act defines three ownership
"issuing public corporations."
levels, which represent threshold percentage values by which to gauge
offeror. 221
the number of shares of a target company held by a tender
By definition, the shares acquired by a tender offeror which would

bring the percentage of the tender offeror's holdings in the target

company across any of the three threshold levels do not have voting
rights." 2 Instead, these shares must have voting rights conferred

215. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
216. U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 3.

217. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1642.
218. Id. at 1642.
219. "Control Shares" are defined as
shares that, except for this chapter, would have voting power with respect
to shares of an issuing public corporation that, when added to all other
shares of the issuing public corporation owned by a person or in respect
to which that person may exercise or direct the exercise of voting power,
would entitle that person, immediately after acquisition of the shares
(directly or indirectly, alone or as part of a group), to exercise or direct
the exercise of the voting power of the issuing public corporation in the
election of directors within any of the following ranges of voting power:
(1) One-fifth (1/5) or more but less than one-third (1/3) of all voting
power. (2) One-third (1/3) or more but less than a majority of all voting
power. (3) A majority or more of all voting power.
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (West Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
220. "Issuing public corporation" means
a corporation that has: (1) one hundred (100) or more shareholders; (2)
its principal place of business, its principal office, or substantial assets
within Indiana; and (3) either: (A) more than ten percent (10%'o) of its
shareholders resident in Indiana; (B) more than ten percent (10%7) of its
shares owned by Indiana residents; or (C) ten thousand (10,000) shareholders resident in Indiana.
IrD. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4 (West Supp. 1988). For purposes of this note, the
term "issuing public corporation" is synonymous with the term "target company."
221. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (West Supp. 1988), supra note 219.
222. Id.
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upon them by the target company's shareholders223 to be valuable as
a means to obtain control of the target company. 224
Tender offerors acquiring control shares only gain voting rights
"to the extent granted by resolution approved by the shareholders
of the issuing public corporation. ' ' 211 Section 9 of the Act requires
a majority vote of all "disinterested shareholders ' ' 226 holding the
particular class of stock, which is the object of the tender offer, for
passage of such a resolution. 2 7 "The practical effect of this
requirement 221 is to condition acquisition of control of a corporation
on approval of a majority2 9 of the preexisting disinterested share223. See infra note 229.

224. Having control of a corporation effectively requires having a majority of

voting rights. Thus, without voting rights, shares of stock are essentially worthless

to the tender offeror. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct.
1637, 1642 (1987).

225.

IND.

IND. CODE ANN.

§ 23-1-42-9(a) (West Supp. 1988).

226. "Interested shares" are:
The shares of an issuing public corporation in respect of which any of the
following persons may exercise or direct the exercise of the voting power
of the corporation in the election of directors: (1) An acquiring person or
member of a group with respect to a control share acquisition. (2) Any
officer of the issuing public corporation. (3) Any employee of the issuing
public corporation who is also a director of the corporation.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-3 (West Supp. 1988).
227. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9(b) (West Supp. 1988).
228. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1641 (emphasis added).

229.

IND. CODE ANN.

§ 23-1-42-7 (West Supp. 1988) states:

(a) If the acquiring person so requests at the time of delivery of an
acquiring person statement [see below] and gives an undertaking to pay
the corporation's expenses of a special meeting, within ten (10) days
thereafter, the directors of the issuing public corporation shall call a
special meeting of shareholders of the issuing public corporation for the
purpose of considering the voting rights to be accorded the shares acquired
or to be acquired in the control share acquisition. (b) Unless the acquiring
person agrees in writing to another date, the special meeting of shareholders shall be held within fifty (50) days after receipt by the issuing public
corporation of the request. (c) If no request is made, the voting rights to
be accorded the shares acquired in the control share acquisition shall be
presented to the next special or annual meeting of shareholders. (d) If the
acquiring person so requests in writing at the time of delivery of the
acquiring person statement, the special meeting must not be held sooner
than thirty (30) days after receipt by the issuing public corporation of the
acquiring person statement.
An "acquiring person statement" is described as follows:
Any person who proposes to make or has made a control share acquisition
may at the person's election deliver an acquiring person statement to the
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230 are not
holders." Thus, control shares carry no voting rights,

useful as a means to obtain control and, therefore, are essentially
worthless to the offeror who acquired the shares as a means to
23
obtain control. 1
B.

COURT
THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME

232

2 33

1. Preemption analysis

The Supreme Court began its analysis by adopting the test that

a state statute is preempted only 'where

compliance with both

issuing public corporation at the issuing public corporation's principal
office. The acquiring person statement must set forth all of the following:
(1) The identity of the acquiring person and each other member of any
group of which the person is a part for the purposes of determining control
shares. (2) A statement that the acquiring person statement is given
pursuant to this chapter. (3) The number of shares of the issuing public
corporation owned (directly or indirectly) by the acquiring person and
each other member of the group. (4) The range of voting power under
which the control share acquisition falls or would, if consummated, fall.
(5) If the control share acquisition has not taken place: (A) a description
in reasonable detail of the terms of the proposed control share acquisition;
and (B) representations of the acquiring person, together with a statement
in reasonable detail of the facts upon which they are based, that the
proposed control share acquisition, if consummated, will not be contrary
to law, and that the acquiring person has the financial capacity to make
the proposed control share acquisition.
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-6 (West Supp. 1988).
230. See supra note 219.
231. See supra note 224.
232. Both the district court and the court of appeals held the Indiana Act
invalid. Each court examined the validity of the Act through a two-step constitutional analysis. The first step of the analysis involved an examination of the Act
under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. This step was taken
to determine whether the Indiana Act was preempted by the Williams Act. The
second step was an examination of the Act under the commerce clause. These steps
also represent the same basic analysis which the Supreme Court in MITE used to
examine the Illinois Act and, as will be seen, the Supreme Court in CTS used to
examine the Indiana Act.
Examining the issue of whether the Indiana Act was preempted by the Williams
Act, the district court recognized that voting rights "are an integral part of the
ownership interest purchased along with a stock certificate." Dynamics Corp. of
America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389, 398 (N.D. I11.1986) (hereinafter
Dynamics]. The court indicated that "[b]y limiting the rights that a tender offeror
can purchase in a control acquisition, the Indiana Act deprives the transaction of
all value and therefore blocks the transaction in practical terms as much as would
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or

a direct prohibition on control acquisition." Id. at 398. The district court stated
that the Indiana Act conflicts with the Williams Act by effectively giving management the right to make the decision whether or not to sell shares, and therefore
tipping the balance between management and the tender offer or in favor of
management and to the detriment of stockholders. Id. at 398-99. The district court
consequently found that the Indiana Act was unconstitutional as applied to the
facts of this case. Id. at 399-400.
The district court also examined the Act within the context of the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 400-06. The court stated that by
limiting the rights that a tender offeror can purchase in a control acquisition, the
Indiana Act deters tender offers and thereby burdens interstate commerce as much
as if the statute blocked the transaction altogether. Dynamics, 637 F. Supp. at 402.
The court then proceeded to hold that the burdens that the Act placed upon
interstate commerce were not outweighed by local benefits. Id. at 403-05. The court
concluded that the Act also did not pass constitutional muster under the commerce
clause. Id. at 406.
Like the district court, the court of appeals determined that the Indiana Act
was preempted by the Williams Act. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp.,
794 F.2d 250, 263 (7th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Dynamics II]. The court of appeals
also found the Act unconstitutional under the commerce clause, holding that the
Indiana Act placed a significant burden on interstate stock transactions. Id. at 264.
Both Indiana, as an intervening party, and CTS filed jurisdictional statements
with the Supreme Court of the United States, following disposition of the case by
the Court of Appeals. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637,
1644 (1987) [hereinafter CTS]. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S.Ct. 258 (1986) (noting probable
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1982)).
233. For recent Supreme Court cases discussing the constitutional doctrine of
preemption, see generally Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987) (federal
Arbitration Act preempted provision of California labor law which stated that wage
collection actions may be maintained without regard to existence of any private
agreement to arbitrate); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987)
(employee's complaint asserting breach of individual employment contracts was not
completely preempted by Federal labor law); Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v.
Coyne, 107 S.Ct. 2211 (1987) (Maine statute requiring employees to provide one
time severance payment to employees was not preempted by ERISA or NLRA);
International Broth. of Elec. Workers, AFLCIO v. Hechler, 107 S.Ct. 2161 (1987)
(employee's state law claim may be preempted by Labor Management Relations
Act); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987) (employee's lawsuit
asserting improper processing of claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated
program was preempted by federal law); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 107
S. Ct. 1542 (1987) (employee's common law tort claim preempted by ERISA);
California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987) (federal
statutes did not preempt California Coastal Commission from imposing a permit
requirement on operation of unpatented mining claim in national forest); International Paper Co. v. Ovellette, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987) (clean Water Act preempted
Vermont Nuisance law when Vermont landowners brought suit against operator of
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where the state 'law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
' 23 4
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. '
In its analysis, the Court focused extensively on the differences
between the Illinois statute in MITE and the Indiana Act, and how
in the Illinois statute had been
it felt the constitutional shortcomings
23 5
legislature.
Indiana
the
by
avoided
In MITE, the overriding concern was that the Illinois statute
favored management against offerors to the shareholders' disadvantage. 23 6 "By contrast, the statute [in CTS] protects the independent
shareholder against both of the contending parties. Thus, the Act
furthers a basic purpose of the Williams Act, 'plac[ing] investors on
23 7 The Court stated
an equal footing with the takeover bidder.'
that the Indiana Act operates on the assumption, implicit in the
Williams Act, that independent shareholders faced with tender offers
are disadvantaged because of their lack of knowledge concerning
those offers. 23 s The Court reasoned that the Indiana Act, which
23 9
those individuals
allows shareholders to vote as a group, protects '24
0
offers.
tender
some
of
aspects
coercive
from "the
However, the Court failed to fully analyze the impact of the
"voting group" requirement of the Act. While allowing shareholders
to vote as a group offers them some protection against being
inadequately informed about a tender offer, the concept of the
''voting group" has two inherent weaknesses: (1) it protects the
interest of the group at the expense of the individual shareholder's
interest, and (2) it gives incumbent management an unfair advantage
vis-A-vis the tender offeror.
An examination of the legislative history of the Williams Act
implicitly indicates Congress intended to protect the interests of

a New York pulp and paper mill); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
107 S. Ct. 683 (1987) (California statute requiring employment practices favoring
pregnant women not preempted by Title VII); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef,
Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988) (employees state tort remedy not preempted by Labor
Management Relations Act).
234. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1644 (citations omitted). See supra notes 37 and 38,
and accompanying text.
235. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1645.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1645-46 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1,
30(1977) (quoting S. REP.-No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967)).
238. Id. at 1646.
239. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-7 (West Supp. 1988), supra note 229.
240. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646.
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shareholders both as a group and as individuals.4 While shareholders' interests as group members may be similar to their individual
interests, those interests are not identical. The individual shareholder,
like all shareholders of a target company, needs complete information concerning a tender offer; however, the individual's interest in
deciding whether to tender his or her own shares is unique. What
may be beneficial for one shareholder may be detrimental to another.
Therefore, individual shareholders should make the final determination of whether to tender their own shares.
The Indiana Act requires a majority vote of shareholders to
confer voting rights upon "control shares. '24 By definition, the
tender offer is a device for obtaining control of a publicly held
corporation.2 43 Without voting rights, shares of stock are essentially
worthless to the tender offeror seeking to obtain control of a publicly
held corporation. 244 Consequently, the tender offeror must invoke
his right to call a special meeting of shareholders, who will decide
whether to confer voting rights upon the shares acquired, or to be
acquired, by the tender offeror. 245 Therefore, the group of shareholders effectively determines whether to tender shares. Thus, contrary to the intent of Congress in adopting the Williams Act, 246 the
rights and interests of the individual are lost among the interests of
the group.
While undoubtedly helping to protect the interests of a majority
of shareholders, the Act does a tremendous disservice to the interests
of the individual shareholder because "it will effectively prevent an
individual investor from selling his stock at a premium. ' 24 7 By
upholding the Indiana statute, the majority does that which the
Court denounced in MITE; it gives credence to state legislative
action when "'[t]he state . . . offers investor protection at the
expense of investor autonomy-an approach quite in conflict with
that adopted by Congress.' '9248 In effect, the Supreme Court has
241. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1982) (reviewing the
legislative history of the Williams Act). See also 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967).
242. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-7 (West Supp. 1988).
243. See supra note 1.
244. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 261 (7th
Cir. 1986).

245. See

IND. CODE ANN.

§ 23-1-42-7 (West Supp. 1988).

246. See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1655 (White, J., dissenting) (focusing on the rights
of minority shareholders).
247. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1654 (White, J., dissenting).
248. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (quoting MITE Corp. v. Dixon,
633 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir. 1980)).
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given support to management's "no-lose" situation under the Indiana Act. If shareholders vote to confer voting rights upon shares
acquired by a tender offeror, the management of the target company
is in the same position as it would have been before passage of the
Indiana Act-it would be confronted with the possibility of a successful tender offer. If shareholders vote not to confer voting rights,
management is in a better position than it would have been before
passage of the Act-there would be no possibility of a successful
tender offer. Therefore, the Act benefits management at the expense
of the tender offeror and individual shareholders-the tender offeror's position, in the scheme of the tender offer, was worsened by
passage of the Act, and individual shareholders are required to
of the majority because of the Act. But for the
submit to the will
"control shares ' 249 provision of the Act, incumbent management
would not have an unfair advantage vis-A-vis the tender offeror and
individual investors could determine whether to tender their shares
with voting rights to the offeror.
Furthermore, the Indiana Act increases the financial burden of
the tender offer on the offeror. For the sake of illustration, assume
Company 0 (the tender offeror) "owns" 40%70 of Company T (the
Indiana target company). Further assume that Company 0 desires
to acquire 11% more of Company T's common stock and that
Company T has 1,000,000 shares of common stock outstanding. Let
$50 equal the per share price offered by Company 0 for the 11 %
of stock, and let $40 equal the market price per share of Company
T's stock during the time of the tender offer. Company 0 now
wishes to have voting rights conferred upon the 1 %oof Company
T's stock to be acquired.
Before passage of the Act, Company 0 would have controlled
Company T, after making the 11 % acquisition, and would have
expended $4,400,00020 to gain that control. Because of the Act,
Company 0 must obtain the vote of 5106 of the disinterested
shareholders, who own 4956 of Company T's stock. If only 20% of
the disinterested shareholders desire to confer voting rights, Company 0 will probably have to increase its offer from $50 per share
to entice another 31076 of the disinterested shareholders to confer
rights and make a successful tender offer possible.
This example illustrates the magnitude of the added financial
costs which the Act can impose upon a tender offeror. If Company
249. See supra note 219.

250. $4,400,000 = .11 x 1,000,000 x $40.
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O has to increase its offering price to $55 per share to entice another
31076 of disinterested shareholders to confer rights, 251 its financial
burden is increased by $1,650,000, simply because of the Act's operation.
Because of the aforementioned difficulties with the Act's "voting group" requirement, the Act tends to significantly tip the balance
contemplated by Congress in favor of management, therefore contradicting Congress' intent in adopting the Williams Act. 2 2 Moreover, the Court recognizes that because it is possible that voting rights
will not be conferred under the Indiana Act until a shareholder
meeting 253 fifty days after commencement of the offer, some delay
beyond the twenty-business-day period25

4

may occur. 25 5 Delay enables

the management of the target company to take action to make the
corporation appear less attractive as a financial opportunity for the
tender offeror. 256 The Court, however, held: "In our view, the
possibility that the Indiana Act will delay some tender offers is
insufficient to require a conclusion that the Williams Act pre-empts
the [Indiana] Act.

' 25 7

In light of the difficulties with the Indiana

Act's "voting group" provision and the chance for delay, management seems to have been so substantially favored by the Act that it
should have been preempted by the Williams Act.
2.

Commerce clause analysis
The Court next examined the Indiana Act under the commerce
clause. It stated: "The principal objects of dormant commerce clause
251. For the sake of simplicity, assume that 31% of the disinterested shareholders decide only to vote to confer rights, not to tender their shares, and that
only 11 % of the outstanding stock is actually tendered. Disinterested shareholders
might be willing to vote to confer rights but unwilling to tender their shares because

of the Indiana Act's dissenters' rights provision. Shareholders might vote to confer
rights but not tender shares since, while they believe a successful offer will increase
the value of their shares, they desire, for whatever reason, to retain those shares.
The dissenters' rights provision of the Indiana Act would protect a shareholder in
making this decision, since he would have dissenters' rights to receive the fair value

of his shares if the offeror's control shares were accorded full voting rights and

the offeror acquired a majority of all voting power. This assumes that the share-

holder later changed his decision to retain his shares. (See

IND.

CODE ANN. §23-1-

42-11 (West Supp. 1987)). However, if more shareholders decided to tender shares,

the financial burden on Company 0 would be further increased.
252. See text following note 291, infra.

253. See

IND. CODE ANN.

§ 23-1-42-7 (West Supp. 1988).

254. That period established by the SEC as the minimum period for which a
tender offer must be held open. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1986).
255. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1648.

256. See supra note 138.

257. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1648.
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scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce.""25 "Because nothing in the Indiana Act imposes a greater
burden on out-of-state offerors than it does on similarly situated
Indiana offerors, we reject the contention that the Act discriminates
against interstate commerce. "

25 9

The Court held that Indiana's interest in regulating its corpo2 60
rations is a legitimate state interest representing a local benefit.
However, the MITE decision rejected the application of the "internal
affairs" doctrine, 261 which seems very similar to the state interest
which the Supreme Court in CTS said serves to legitimize the Indiana
Act. While discussing a purported conflict of laws problem, the
Court maintained that a State has the authority to regulate domestic
corporations, which includes the power to define the voting rights
of shareholders. 262 The Court then concluded that the Indiana Act
does not create a "risk of inconsistent regulation by different
states.'2 63 However, the Court's focus on the potential state law
conflict disregards the underlying purpose of the Act to regulate
tender offers, and fails to address the potential federal-state conflict
between the Williams Act and Indiana's statute.
Turning to the issue of shareholder autonomy, the Court concluded that "the possibility of coercion in some takeover bids offers
additional justification for Indiana's decision to promote the auton' 264
Arguably, however, the Indiomy of independent shareholders.

ana Act essentially destroys rather than promotes the "autonomy of
independent shareholders." 265 In light of this argument and the
Court's rejection of the "internal affairs" doctrine in MITE, the
Court's justifications for the Indiana Act are illusory. Therefore,
under the Pike test, 266 the burden imposed on interstate commerce
267 The
"is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
burdens imposed upon interstate commerce and, more specifically,
258. Id.

259. Id. at 1649.
260. Id. at 1651-52.
261. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
262. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1651 (emphasis added).
265. Id.
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to
266. The test states: " ...
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
public
effectuate a legitimate local
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970).
267. Id.
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the burdens imposed upon the national securities markets are not
outweighed by these illusory benefits.

VIII.

MITE TO CTS: HAS THE SUPREME COURT IMPLIEDLY
OVERRULED ITS DECISION IN MITE?
After scrutinizing the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis
of the state statutes presented for review in the MITE and CTS
cases, a broader reading of both the statutes and the case opinions,
in light of the Williams Act, reveals inconsistencies in the Court's
general approach to reaching its decisions. These inconsistencies
become clear when the differences between the Illinois Act reviewed
in MITE and the Indiana Act reviewed in CTS are explored.
The Illinois Business Take-Over Act examined in MITE focused
primarily on providing shareholders with information concerning
impending tender offers. 261 In contrast to the Illinois Act, the Indiana
Control Shares Acquisition Act essentially deprives individual shareholders of the right to sell their voting rights in a target company
when a tender offeror purchases the shareholder's stock.
Although the Illinois Act and the Indiana Act were very different, 269 both statutes sought to regulate the tender offer process, and
therefore should have been analyzed similarly by the Supreme Court.
However, while the Court in both MITE and CTS focused on the
underlying purpose of the Illinois and Indiana Acts, respectively,
the Court focused on different purposes of the Williams Act in
analyzing the two statutes. This difference in the Court's approach
explains, in large part, why the Illinois Act was invalidated and the
Indiana Act upheld.
A.

FROM

MITE

The plurality opinion in MITE was written by Justice White.
His opinion focused on the disclosure requirements of the Williams
Act and the Act's purpose to protect the investor through such
requirements. 270 Justice White's opinion also focused on another
fundamental purpose of the Williams Act, to favor neither management nor the tender offeror, as well as Congress' intent that takeover
bids not be discouraged because they provide a beneficial check on
inefficient management. 2 7' Justice White placed considerable empha268.
269.
270.
271.

See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
See generally supra note 268 and accompanying text.
See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1982).
See id. at 633-34.
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sis on his understanding that Congress intended for investors to
272
make their own, informed decisions concerning tender offers. His
was joined only by Chief
opinion on the preemption issue, however,
271
Blackmun.
Justice
and
Burger
Justice
B.

CTS

The majority in CTS, which consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist
together with Justices Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, and Powell,
who wrote the majority opinion, 274 did not focus on the disclosure
requirements of the Williams Act and Congress' intent to favor
neither management nor the tender offeror, as did the plurality in
MITE. Rather, it focused primarily on the purpose of the Williams
Act to protect investors, and on what the majority considered a
protective aspect of the Indiana Act. 275 This "protective aspect" of
the Indiana Act is its provision which requires shareholders to vote
276
as a group when presented with the prospect of a tender offer.
The majority stated that by allowing shareholders to vote as a group,
the Indiana Act protects them from the "coercive aspects" of certain
tender offers. 277 With respect to the issue of whether this provision
of the Indiana Act conflicted with and was preempted by the
Williams Act, the majority did not feel compelled to follow the
opinion did not represent the
reasoning of MITE since the plurality
278
views of a majority of the Justices.
The majority in CTS indicated it believed the predominant
concern of the MITE plurality was that the Illinois Act operated to
favor management vis-A-vis offerors, to the detriment of shareholders. 279 However, the majority proceeded to state that the Indiana
Act was distinguishable from the Illinois Act in that it protects the
independent shareholder against both management and the tender
offeror. 210 Although it properly recognized this protective aspect as
a legitimate objective of the Indiana Act, the majority failed to
consider whether management or the tender offeror is favored by
272. See id. at 639.
273. See id. at 626.
274. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1640
(1987). Justice Scalia concurred. Id.
275. See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646.
276. For the actual text of this provision see supra note 229.
277. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646.
278. Id. at 1645.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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the Indiana Act, and consequently whether Congress' intent to favor
neither management nor the tender offeror is therefore frustrated.
By failing to adequately consider all of the objectives of Congress
in adopting the Williams Act, the majority did not properly analyze
the question of the constitutionality of the Indiana Act under the
supremacy clause.
In upholding the Indiana Act as a result of a legitimate exercise
of state power, the majority failed to consider whether the Act upset
the balance between management and the tender offeror. The majority upheld the Indiana Act under the commerce clause; however,
the legitimacy of any state power depends, in part, upon whether
that power conflicts with any federal power as evidenced by federal
law. Although a state may properly regulate tender offers to protect
investors, the majority overemphasized the protective nature of the
Indiana Act's provision requiring shareholders to vote as a group,
lost sight of the balance between management and the tender offeror
and either discounted or ignored Justice White's focus on this
balance in his plurality opinion in MITE. By concentrating on the
fact that the specific constitutional problems presented by the Illinois
Act were avoided in enacting the Indiana Control Shares Acquisition
Act, and on the view that the Indiana Act protects the "independ28
ent" shareholder against both the tender offeror and management, '
the majority essentially ignored the balance contemplated by Congress and presumed the balance was not upset.
The Indiana Act presents a serious problem involving the control
of corporations which was not presented by the Illinois Act. Because
the majority in CTS failed to focus on all of the purposes of the
Williams Act in its analysis of the Indiana Act, it failed to recognize
the problem. As recognized by Justice White's dissenting opinion in
CTS, the Indiana Act will, contrary to the purposes of the Williams
Act, frustrate individual investment decisions and prevent individual
shareholders from realizing the opportunity to sell shares at a
premium over market price by removing voting rights from the
individual's shares in the context of a tender offer. 212 Justice White's
dissent essentially addresses the effects of the problem which the
majority failed to recognize and which will next be explored.
C.

WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO SELL CONTROL IN A PUBLICLY-HELD
CORPORATION?

A careful reading of the Williams Act and the Supreme Court's
decisions in MITE and CTS reveals a fundamental underlying as281. See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1645-46.
282. See id. at 1653-56.
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sumption about who has the right to sell control in a publicly-held
corporation. Both Congress, in adopting the Williams Act, and the
plurality in MITE assumed the individual shareholder has the right

to sell a pro rata amount of control in a corporation. However, by

upholding the Indiana Act in CTS, the majority disregarded this

assumption. This oversight was in large part a function of the CTS
majority's failure to focus on all of the purposes of the Williams
Act, especially the maintenance of the balance between the interests

of management and the tender offeror. The assumption by both
Congress and the Supreme Court in MITE was that control of a
publicly-held corporation is a property right of the individual shareholder; the Supreme Court in CTS considered control to be a

corporate asset.
1.

"Control" as a property right of the individual shareholder

The Williams Act is centered around disclosure requirements
designed to furnish individual investors with adequate information

to allow them to determine whether to tender their shares.2"3 Implicit
in the purpose for these requirements is the assumption that individ-

ual shareholders have a right to sell shares with voting rights, which

enables them to sell a pro rata amount of "control ' 1214 to a tender
offeror. Control is a function of the ownership of stock with voting
rights. 25 To be able to obtain control and therefore effectuate the

primary purpose of a tender offer, a tender offeror must acquire
shares which have voting rights. With this understanding, the assumption that Congress intended the individual shareholder to 2be6
able to tender shares with voting rights is not difficult to accept. 1
283. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
284. One commentator has defined "control" as "the capacity to choose
directors." Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1958)
[hereinafter Berle]. For a more recent commentary on the notion of corporate
control, see Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 22
(1963).
285. Berle, supra note 284, at 1213.
286. For authority which supports the contention that a purpose of Congress
in enacting legislation can be inferred from the particular statute, see Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). See generally Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546 (1973). Although the Williams Act does not explicitly recognize the right of
the individual investor to sell a proportionate amount of control in a corporation,
the Act does recognize the right of the individual shareholder to make an informed
decision concerning whether or not to tender his or her shares. See supra notes 4143 and accompanying text. Without the right to sell voting rights with shares, the
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A failure to accept this assumption necessarily renders the individual's decision valueless and is tantamount to disregarding Congress'
clear intent to allow the individual to make his or her own choice.
Justice White's plurality opinion in MITE recognizes Congress'
intent for investors to make their own decisions concerning whether
to tender shares. 217 Implicit in this notion is the assumption that
individual investors have the right to sell a proportionate amount of
control in a particular corporation along with the shares themselves.
The opinion provides no indication that the individual shareholders,
as opposed to a group of shareholders, do not have a right to sell
voting rights along with their shares. Moreover, the opinion is
consistent with and supports the existence of this right.
2.

"Control" as a "corporate asset"

The Indiana Act's main provision, the "control shares" section, 2 8 effectively eliminates the right of individual shareholders to
sell a proportionate amount of control along with their shares by
removing voting rights from shares subject to it. Instead of giving
the individual shareholder the right to "sell control," the Indiana
Act confers this right upon shareholders as a group. 2 9
In MITE, the plurality at least implicitly held that the individual
shareholder has a right to sell a pro rata amount of control in a
publicly-held corporation, based on the number of shares that he or
she owns. Another view regards control as an asset which is owned
by the corporation.2 90 This view holds that shareholders as a group,
or a majority of shareholders, own the right to sell control. Indeed,
this is an interpretation which the majority in CTS seems to have
implicitly adopted by upholding the Indiana Act.
right to tender shares would be meaningless, since voting rights are necessary for a
tender offeror to obtain and exercise control. Therefore, the right of the individual
shareholder to tender shares with voting rights is implicit in the Williams Act.

287. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639.

288. See supra note 219.
289. Once a determination is made by shareholders as a group that control

should be sold (that voting rights should be conferred upon control shares), all
shareholders need not tender their shares. All shareholders, however, do have
dissenters' rights to receive the fair value of their shares. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-142-11 (West Supp. 1988).
290. See Berle, supra note 284, at 1220-22. Under this view, any value
associated with control belongs to the corporation rather than the shareholders. Id.
at 1221. Voting power is part of the corporate mechanism to be exercised "for the
benefit of the entire corporation." Id. at 1222.
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In doing so, the majority essentially held that a state has the
power to determine whether individual shareholders, or shareholders
as a group, should have the right to sell control. 29I By upholding the
Indiana Act, the majority indicates that a state may take the right
to sell control from individual shareholders and give that right to
shareholders as a group. Legislation such as the Indiana Act thwarts
the potential success of certain tender offers by precluding the tender
offeror from obtaining voting rights and contravenes the policy of
the Williams Act. The ultimate effect of the Court's decision in CTS
is to give management an initial advantage in control contests by
allowing states to give a majority of shareholders, rather than
individuals, the right to determine whether to sell control.
By taking the right to sell control from the individual and giving
that right to the group, states can increase the burden on the tender
offeror, and therefore favor management. The tender offeror is
required to convince a majority of disinterested shareholders to sell
control, rather than simply to acquire a majority of all outstanding
shares. In all tender offer situations, except those in which the
offeror desires to buy all outstanding shares, Indiana-type legislation
requires the offeror to somehow convince more shareholders to sell
control than legislation giving the individual the right to sell control. 292 Indiana-type legislation therefore gives management an initial
advantage in most control contests.
By dramatically changing its general approach to the question
of the constitutionality of state takeover legislation, the Supreme
Court may have also changed the outcome of the CTS case. Had
the Court taken the approach of the MITE plurality, it may have
held the Indiana Act invalid in CTS. By following the MITE plurality's approach, the majority in CTS may have realized that the
Indiana Act favors management and eliminates the right of the
individual to tender his or her shares with voting rights.
The majority in CTS should have followed the approach of the
MITE plurality, recognized the problems presented by the Indiana
Act, and held it invalid. In upholding the Indiana Act, the Court
gave judicial support to legislation which favors management in
control contests, frustrates individual investment decisions and specifically precludes individual shareholders from realizing the opportunity to sell shares at a premium by removing voting rights from
the individual's shares.2 93 Although CTS did not expressly overrule
291. See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1652.
292. See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
293. See generally supra note 291 and accompanying text.
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MITE, CTS seriously limits the application of MITE. Because of
the CTS majority's unwillingness to follow the MITE plurality's
approach, the applicability of MITE seems to be limited to state
legislation which substantially burdens interstate commerce. Since
state legislatures are unlikely to include MITE-like provisions in
takeover legislation, MITE seems to have very limited applicability
in challenges to state statutes. Therefore, CTS represents the dominant case law to be applied in challenges to state takeover legislation.
IX.

DELAWARE LEGISLATION-ANOTHER GENERATION?

In the aftermath of CTS, Delaware has enacted new takeover
legislation. Delaware has long been known for the expertise of its
legislature, judiciary and bar association in the area of corporate
law. It is the state to which other states look for new developments
in the corporate legal arena. Often, decisions of Delaware courts
give guidance to and are followed by courts in other states. Corporate
law developments in Delaware are important because they often
represent future developments in other jurisdictions.
A.

SECTION 203

After the Supreme Court in CTS upheld the constitutionality of
the Indiana statute, the Delaware legislature was quick to enact new
takeover legislation. 294 Section 203 is designed to place a three-year
restriction on business combinations between certain acquiring corporations and the acquired Delaware corporation. The statute places
limitations not on the tender offer process (like the Indiana statute),
but on the permissible actions of an acquiring stockholder after
stock of the target has been purchased. The term "business combination" is broadly defined, and includes a merger, consolidation,
sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge and transfer.2 95 Specifically,
the statute applies to "interested stockholders," who are defined as
persons owning 15% or more of the outstanding voting stock of the

target corporation .296

294. For a brief history of the development of § 203, see Black & Decker
Corp. v. American Standard Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,684, at 98,146
(February 23, 1988).
295. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988).
296. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(5) (1988). Section 203 explicitly

excludes certain persons from the definition of "interested shareholders" when
they met specific criteria prior to December 23, 1987. See id. The term "own"
includes beneficial ownership of such stock, the right to acquire it, the right to
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The statute does allow certain business combinations during the

normal three-year period of restriction if any of three requirements

are met: (1) prior to the date when the acquiring stockholder became

an interested stockholder, the board of directors of the target
approved the business combination or the transaction making the
stockholder an interested stockholder; (2) after such transaction the
interested stockholder owned at least 8507o of the stock of the target;

or (3) on or after such date the business combination is approved
by the board, and by the affirmative vote of at least 66.7%297 of the

outstanding stock not owned by the interested stockholder.

The statute also lists certain circumstances in which the restricor
tions of § 203 will not apply, including (1) when the directors 29
8
scheme,
statutory
the
of
out
opt
to
decide
stockholders of the target

(2) when the target corporation does not have a class of voting stock
listed on a national exchange, or authorized for quotation in the
association or
quotation system of a registered national securities
299

and (3) when a
held by more than 2,000 stockholders of record,
stockholder inadvertently becomes an interested shareholder, and

soon thereafter divests himself of3 the shares which caused him to
become an interested shareholder.
B.

00

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ADDRESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
§203

Considering the relatively short history of § 203, it has not
taken long for Delaware's legislative response to CTS to meet with
301 In BNS, Inc. v.
challenge from those persons to whom it applies.
vote it and having an agreement, arrangement or understanding to acquire, hold,
vote or dispose of such stock with any other person owning it. See DEL. CODE
"individual,
ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(8) (1988). The term "person" is defined as any
DEL. CODE
entity."
other
or
association
unincorporated
partnership,
corporation,
ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(6) (1988).

297.
298.

299.
300.

8, § 203(a) (1988).
tit. 8, § 203(b)(l)-(3) (1988).
ANN. tit. 8, § 203(b)(4) (1988).
ANN. tit. 8, § 203(b)(5) (1988).

DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
See DEL. CODE ANN.

DEL. CODE
DEL. CODE

301. The first challenge to § 203 in a federal district court came in Black &
93,684, at
Decker Corp. v. American Standard Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
preliminary
a
sought
Corporation
Decker
&
Black
1988).
98,144 (February 23,
injunction against the enforcement of § 203 and a declaration that it was unconstitutional. Id. at 98,145. Black & Decker made a conditional tender offer for
American Standard and planned to merge the two entities if the offer was successful.
Id. However, apparently knowing that § 203 would thwart its plan, Black & Decker
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BNS sought a preliminary injunction3o3 and a
declaration that § 203 was unconstitutional.04 In Koppers, the court

Koppers Co., Inc.,

02

examined BNS' probability for success on the merits through an
analysis of the constitutionality of § 203, in light of the Williams

Act and CTS. In its analysis, the court first recognized that § 203
"implicate[s] Williams Act policies."30 The court then indicated that

the purpose of § 203 is to protect shareholders from certain hostile
tender offers.30 6 It next stated that Delaware has a legitimate interest
in regulating tender offers, "despite the significant influence such
regulation has over the transfer of securities and the so-called market

for corporate control."

30 7

The court explained that the issue in these

post-CTS cases is "what degree of restriction of tender offers is

constitutional.'

'308

In addressing this issue, the court indicated that statutes which
have a serious potential to limit successful tender offers do not
conflict with the purposes of the Williams Act if beneficial yet

hostile offers still "have a meaningful opportunity for success." 30 9
This is true even if the statute creates substantial imbalance between

brought suit in federal district court.
Black & Decker argued that the statute stood as a substantial roadblock
to its
merger plan, which was the sole purpose of its tender offer. Id. at 98,147.
American
Standard argued an injunction should not be granted because the plaintiffs
had no
standing and failed to show they would suffer irreparable harm. Id. Black
& Decker
further argued that the confusion about the constitutionality of § 203
in the market
might cause its tender offer to fail. Id.
Although the court in American Standard found that Black & Decker
had
standing, Id. at 98,149, it denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction.
Id. at 98,152. Black & Decker's financing for the tender offer had been
conditioned
upon its obtaining a majority of the stock of American Standard.
Id. at 98,150.
Therefore, the court found that "with or without Section 203, the Plaintiffs'
.. .
position would be exactly the same." Id. Furthermore, the court indicated
that the
plaintiffs failed to show that if the motion for an injunction were granted,
other
variables contributing to confusion in the market would not also hamper
the success
of the tender offer. Id. at 98,151. For such reasons, the court held
that Black &
Decker failed to prove sufficient potential for irreparable harm, and
declined to
reach the question of its probability for success on the merits. Id. at
98,152.
302. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,730 (April 1, 1988).
303. See Koppers, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,396.
304. Id. at 98,394.
305. Id. at 98,400.
306. See id.
307. Id. at 98,401.
308. Koppers, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,401.
309. Id.
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10
management and the tender offeror. The court explained that, as
was the case in CTS, the statute is preempted by the Williams Act
only if it frustrates 'the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 3
31 2
In its application of the analysis of the Supreme Court in CTS,
the court in Koppers found that § 203 favors incumbent management.31 However, the court stated, "[w]hile the statute does give
target management an advantage in fighting an unwanted takeover,
CTS suggests that incidentally pro-management measures undertaken
3 14 The
to benefit shareholders do not offend Williams Act policies.1
court recognized that although the trend of state legislatures to
entrust the interests of shareholders to management has been seriously criticized, such entrustment is the "norm in current corporate
law." 5 The court then concluded that "notwithstanding the promanagement tilt of the Delaware statute," § 203 is probably consti31 6
tutional under the supremacy clause. Because BNS failed to establish a probability of success, the court denied its motion for a
preliminary injunction.3" 7
Another opportunity to examine the constitutionality of §203
31s
came in RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc. Again,
the tender offeror, in this case RP Acquisition Corporation ("RP"),
conditioned its offer on § 203 being held invalid, since it desired 31to9
merge the target corporation, Staley, into one of its subsidiaries.
Once again, the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of § 203.320
In analyzing the constitutionality of § 203 under the supremacy
clause, the court discussed the purposes of the Williams Act. It
indicated that the "paramount purpose" of the Act is shareholder
protection.3 2' The court viewed the plurality opinion in MITE as

310. See id.
311. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
312. For the court's four-step preemption analysis taken from the CTS decision, see Koppers, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,401-02.
313. See id.at 98,402.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Koppers, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,402. The court also found that
§ 203 did not violate the commerce clause. See id. at 98,404.
317. Id. at 98,404.
318. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,763, at 98,571 (May 9, 1988).
319. See RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,763, at 98,571, 98,572 (May 9, 1988).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 98,574.
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giving "vigorous and broad preemptive effect to the Williams Act's
policy of offeror-management neutrality." 3 22 Rather than determining what standard the Court in CTS employed, the court in Staley
followed the "analytical path" mapped out in MITE.3 23 The court
explained the legitimate interests of the individual states in regulating
tender offers, and then framed the preemption issue as being: "How
far ... the tender offer playing field [can] be tilted by a state in
favor of the offeror or of management without running into Williams

Act preemption.'

'324

The court indicated that § 203 provides shareholder protection,
but recognized that "it also exercises substantial deterrent effects on
tender offers. 3 25 The court stated that §203 can prevent the acquiring person or entity from realizing economic benefit from a merger
with the target corporation for a period of three years. 326 Further,
the court indicated that by limiting such beneficial mergers, the
number of tender offers may be lowered.327 The court then found
that the "crucial inquiry" is whether "hostile offers still have a
meaningful opportunity for success despite the operation of Section
203 ."'328
In its attempt to resolve this issue, the court discussed the
plaintiff's allegation that the 85% exception to the general rule of §
203(a) was illusory. The plaintiff argued that those making hostile
offers have typically failed to reach this percentage level of ownership. 329 However, the court found the plaintiff's argument and
evidence unpersuasive, stating that "hostile tender offers retain a
meaningful opportunity for success under the 85 percent exception. ' ' 330 Finding that the 85% exception survived constitutional
attack, the court did not analyze the other exceptions to the general
rule of § 203(a). 33 1 In concluding its analysis, the court compared
the Indiana Statute examined in CTS with § 203.332 The court found
that the Delaware statute has a less deterrent effect on tender offers
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id.
Id.
Staley, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,575.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 98,575-76.

329. Staley, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,576.
330. Id. at 98,577.
331. Id. at 98,578.
332. Id.
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than the Indiana Act, 333 and held that the plaintiff failed to show §
' 3 4 Thus, the court denied the
203 is "most likely unconstitutional.
335
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.
Although § 203 does not directly burden the tender offer process
itself, it certainly burdens the process on an indirect level. Certainly
many, if not most, corporate tender offerors have as a primary goal
of their tender offer a plan to merge or somehow consolidate with
the target corporation. By substantially limiting the circumstances in
which an interested shareholder can combine with the target, § 203
unquestionably deters some tender offers. The question is whether
the deterrent effect of § 203 is impermissible.
By deterring tender offers, § 203 at the very least favors incumbent management somewhat more than the tender offeror. When
the number of hostile tender offers with which management is
confronted is smaller, fewer are the number of actions which management must take to repel such offers. Thus, the balance between
the offeror and management, which Congress contemplated in enacting the Williams Act, is arguably upset by § 203. The potential
to deprive numerous tender offers for Delaware corporations of a
meaningful opportunity for success, although perhaps only indirectly, seems to indicate § 203 is unconstitutional.
However, regardless of the constitutionality of § 203, the Koppers and Staley cases illustrate an important problem. Both cases
illuminate the utter lack of uniformity in this area of corporate law.
For example, the court in Koppers patterned its analysis on that of
the Supreme Court in CTS, while the same court, albeit a different
judge, in Staley relied heavily upon the analysis of the Supreme
Court in MITE. Indeed, in general, most judicial decisions concerning takeover legislation point to a critical need-the need for uniformity.
X.

A

PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE: A RETURN TO THE
WILLIAMS ACT

Focus

OF THE

Congress should reevaluate the Williams Act and amend the
legislation to give the individual states and the Supreme Court
direction with respect to the issue of who has the right to sell control.
Congress should explicitly indicate either that the individual share333. See id.
334. Staley, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,577. The court also found that
§ 203 did not violate the commerce clause. Id. at 98,580.
335. Id. at 98,581.
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holder owns the right or that the several states have the power to
assign and define the right to sell control. Generally, Congress should
seriously consider the need for uniform legislation governing the
tender offer. However, until Congress takes such action, if ever,
states should very carefully consider the enactment of any legislation
which would deprive the individual shareholder of the right to sell
control (i.e., the Indiana Act), or temporarily deprive the offeror of
the opportunity to merge with the target (i.e., the Delaware Act).
The United States Senate has drafted legislation designed to
reform federal law governing tender offers.33 6 This proposed legislation includes a provision which would allow states to continue to
regulate the internal affairs of their corporations.33 7 The Senate Bill
further provides that the internal affairs of a corporation include
matters relating to the voting rights of shareholders. 3"' Therefore,
the proposed legislation would allow states to determine who has
the right to sell control.33 9 However, the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs has suggested that a bill to
reform federal tender offer legislation should impose a requirement
on publicly-held corporations that every share of voting securities
have the same vote.3 40 Opponents of this proposal have argued that
it would invalidate Indiana-type control share acquisition statutes
despite CTS.3 41 Opponents have further argued that such a proposal
would intrude upon the states' right to regulate the internal affairs
of their corporations.3 42 Because of such concerns, the committee
rejected the proposal and directed the SEC to study the impact of
such suggested reform of federal law. 43 Arguably, such proposal
336. See, e.g., S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
337. S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1987).
338. Id.
339. See id.
340. S. REP. No. 265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1987). This report was a
response to the Tender Offer Disclosure and Fairness Act of 1987, S. 1323, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-17 (1987), another proposed piece of legislation dealing with
tender offers and amending the provisions of the Williams Act. This Senate Bill
would amend the substantive and procedural provisions of the Williams Act to
curb abuses of the tender offer process and to expand the protective nature of
federal law. S. 1323, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1(b) (1987). However, it does not
provide any guidance concerning the proper roles of state and federal legislation
governing tender offers. Senate Bill 1324 augments the provisions of the proposed
Tender Offer Disclosure and Fairness Act of 1987 by expressly addressing the issue
of the interrelationship of state and federal legislation.
341. S. REP. No. 265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1987).
342. Id.
343. Id.
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would not affect the right of states to regulate the internal affairs
of their corporations, and would nonetheless be justified by the need
for uniform regulation of tender offers.
Although state takeover legislation of the type enacted by Indiana has been upheld by the Supreme Court, other states should
fully consider its potential effects before enacting similar legislation.
Potential shareholders may be unwilling to invest in a business
incorporated in, or desiring to move its principal office to a state
with similar legislation. Potential shareholders may be lost because
they may be precluded from realizing the opportunity to sell their
shares at a premium in the future. This is especially true if the
business is part of an industry in which takeover attempts are
prevalent. Such a business may be compelled to reconsider a decision
to incorporate or locate in a state with Indiana-type legislation.
Ideally, states considering the enactment of takeover legislation
should focus on potential provisions designed to: (1) provide protection for shareholders, by affording them complete information; (2)
allow individuals to determine whether to tender their shares; (3)
avoid any "delay" similar to that caused by the Indiana Act, by
allowing the possibility of a successful tender offer at the end of the
44
twenty-day period established by the SEC as the minimum period
for which a tender offer must be held open; (4) generally balance
the interests of incumbent management and the tender offeror while
protecting the interests of shareholders; and (5) enable the tender
offeror to merge with the target under less restrictive circumstances
than those created by the Delaware Act.
XI.

CONCLUSION

Congress, in adopting the Williams Act, intended to protect the
individual shareholder in making a decision whether to tender shares
with voting rights, while balancing the legitimate interests of incumbent management and tender offerors. The United States Supreme
Court upset this balance by upholding Indiana's Control Shares
Acquisition Act. An analysis of the Act, in light of the supremacy
clause and the commerce clause of the United States Constitution,
indicates that the Act tips the balance contemplated by Congress in
favor of incumbent management to the detriment of tender offerors
and individual shareholders. In determining whether to adopt takeover legislation similar to that enacted by Indiana, a state's legislature should carefully consider the potential negative effects of such
344. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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legislation, which eliminates the right of individual shareholders to
sell a pro rata amount of control with their shares.
JAMES S. ZMUDA

